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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 USIA-15 TRSE-00

MBFR-03 SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-10 SS-15 AEC-11 OMB-01 IO-13

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: AUGUST 13 SPC MEETING: BASIC CHARACTER OF ALLIED
NEGOTIATING POSITION

BEGIN SUMMARY: AUGUST 13 SPC DISCUSSION SURFACED QUESTION OF WHETHER U.S. NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN "OUTCOME" IN THE SENSE USED IN THE U.S. APRIL 30 PAPER, OR WHETHER IT SHOULD BE SEEN AS A BARGAINING POSITION FROM WHICH ALLIES MIGHT AT SOME POINT RECEDE. CANADA AND FRG BELIEVED THAT ALLIES SHOULD BE DEVELOPING BOTH A STATEMENT OF BASIC SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES AND AN INTIAL NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL, IN ORDER TO MAKE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT ALLIES WOULD PROPOSE AT THE OUTSET AND WHAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING ULTIMATELY TO ACCEPT. U.S. OPPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF SEPARATE FALLBACK POSITIONS AND REITERATED U.S. INTEREST IN ADVANCING FRAMEWORK VERSION OF PREFERRED ALLIED POSITION AT AN EARLY STAGE. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING COURSE OF AUGUST 13 SPC DISCUSSION OF U.S., UK, AND
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BELGIAN MBFR PROPOSALS, THE ALLIES RAISED QUESTIONS ON THE BASIC CHARACTER OF THE REPORT WHICH SPC WAS DRAFTING ON AN ALLIANCE APPROACH TO MBFR. FRG (RANTZAU) AGREED WITH CANADIAN OBSERVATION THAT ALLIES WOULD PROBABLY NEED TWO

KINDS OF PAPER: ONE SETTING FORTH THE ALLIES' BASIC SUBSTANTIVE POSITION; THE OTHER SETTING FORTH THEIR INITIAL NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL. CANADA (MARSHALL) ARGUED THAT THE ALLIES NEEDED TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEIR OPENING POSITION AND ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES, SINCE THERE WAS AN OBVIOUS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT THE ALLIES WOULD "SEEK" AND WHAT THEY WOULD "PROPOSE." THE ALLIES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NEED TO BEEF UP THEIR OPENING POSITION SINCE THEY CAN NOT EXPECT TO GET EVERYTHING THEY ASK FOR.

2. BELGIUM (WILLOT) BELIEVED THAT NEGOTIATING "PROPOSAL" WAS THE WRONG

TERM, SINCE SECTION II OF THE PROSPECTIVE ALLIANCE PAPER WOULD DESCRIBE THE MAIN SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE ALLIED POSITION, AND NOT AN OPENING PROPOSAL. THE ALLIES MUST FIRST DECIDE UPON THIS BASIC SUBSTANTIVE POSITION BEFORE DEVELOPING THEIR STARTING APPROACH, I.E. "BEFORE DECIDING HOW TO LIE WE MUST KNOW WHAT THE TRUTH IS." IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THE ALLIES MUST KNOW WHAT THEIR ESSENTIAL POSITION IS THAT BELGIUM FAVORS A CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF WHAT THE ALLIES WOULD PROPOSE FOR THE SECOND STAGE OF MBFR. THE ALLIES MUST BE CAREFUL IN DECIDING WHICH SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THEIR BASIC POSITION THEY WOULD INCLUDE IN THEIR OPENING PROPOSAL. SOME ELEMENTS WOULD CLEARLY BE NECESSARY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ALLIES SHOULD STATE AT THE OUTSET: THEIR INTEREST IN ACHIEVING A COMMON CEILING, THAT THERE IS A "FLOOR" OF 10PERCENT OVERALL REDUCTIONS IN NATO FORCES, THE FACT THAT ONLY U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE FIRST PHASE, AND THAT THE ALLIES ENVISAGE A SECOND STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

3. FRG REP (RANTZAU) CONSIDERED IT QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL REJECT THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL OUTRIGHT AND THE ALLIES WILL QUICKLY NEED TO FIND A REMEDY. THE RESULT OF THIS COULD BE THAT IN A MATTER OF WEEKS THE ALLIES MIGHT BE DEEP IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS OVER FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS. RANTZAU THEREFORE AGREED WITH CANADA THAT WHILE THE ALLIES WOULD NEED QUICKLY TO DEVELOP THEIR BASIC APPROACH, THEY WILL ALSO NEED TO PREPARE AN OPENING POSITION.

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4. U.S. REP DREW UPON JULY 27 PAPER TO REMIND ALLIES OF CLEARLY STATED U.S. VIEW THAT WHAT NATO IS DEVELOPING AT THE PRESENT TIME IS A BASIC FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD PUT FORWARD EARLY IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WHICH THE ALLIES COULD NOT ADVANCE AS A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT PROPOSITION.

5. UK OBSERVED THAT DISCUSSION ONCE AGAIN INDICATED DIFFICULTY IN DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN A NEGOTIATING POSITION AND NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. IN UK VIEW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE TERM "PROPOSAL" COULD MEAN ANY NUMBER OF PROPOSALS BY THE ALLIES. IN ANY CASE, THIS DISCUSSION RAISES THE MAJOR QUESTION FOR THE ALLIES OF THE BASIC PURPOSE WHICH THEIR PAPER IS INTENDED TO SERVE.

6. COMMENT: SINCE IN RECENT MONTHS THEY HAVE BEEN THINKING LARGELY IN TERMS OF "OUTCOMES," ALLIES APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT WHAT THEY ARE NOW EXAMINING UNDER THE HEADING OF "NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL" IS AN ULTIMATE POSITION AND THAT AN EXPANDED VERSION WILL BE NECESSARY AT THE OUTSET IN ORDER TO HAVE ENOUGH NEGOTIATING "FAT." WE WILL ARGUE STRONGLY AGAINST THE DEVELOPMENT OF FALLBACK POSITIONS AT THIS STAGE OR OF BEEFING UP THE PRESENT U.S. PROPOSAL WITH UNREALISTIC ADDITIONS. AT AUGUST 16 SPC MEETING, WE PLAN TO STATE THAT US FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL IS, IN OUR VIEW, A STRONG, BUT STILL CREDIBLE, INITIAL NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL. WE WILL ALSO REASSURE ALLIES OF CONTINUING U.S. INTEREST IN A CAREFUL, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ADEQUATE ALLOWANCE FOR CLOSE CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE ALLIES EACH STEP ALONG THE WAY.

7. WE EXPECT THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A COMMON ALLIED APPROACH TO THE HANDLING OF INITIAL PROPOSALS IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATING STRATEGY AND ASSUME THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE COVERING THIS ASPECT FULLY IN ITS FORTHCOMING CONTRIBUTION OF THIS SUBJECT. (PARA 3 STATE 158062). END COMMENT.

RUMSFELD

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